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COMMENTARY
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LAW AND COMMERCE: GEORGE
MITCHELL (CHESTERHALL) LTD. v. FINNEY LOCK SEEDS
LTD.
The decision in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney
Lock Seeds Ltd.1 attracted a certain amount of attention in the
English press. This was not because of the perceived importance
of the case - indeed, the decision was seen as a rather quaint
English legal dispute about cabbages with "no hearts". 2 The fact
that made the case noteworthy for the press was that this was
Lord Denning M.R.'s last judgment before his retirement. I will
try to show that the case is an important one and one that is
potentially disastrous for the commercial community.
The Facts
The plaintiffs ordered 30 lbs. of cabbage seed for £192 which
they planted over 63 acres. Six months later what appeared to be
ordinary cabbage leaves turned out to be commercially useless.
The plaintiffs recovered £100,000 (£61,000 damages plus £39,000)
from Parker J.,2a who gave short shrift to a disclaimer clause
which, to the neutral observer, seems watertight. 3
This decision was affirmed by a unanimous Court of Appeal.
Lord Denning found the disclaimer clause disallowing expectancy
damages invalid under what is now s. 55(3) of the Sale of Goods
Act. That provision allows the courts to strike down any clause in
a commercial contract which the court finds to be "unreason-
able". Oliver L.J. did not find it necessary to rely on s. 55(3) since
he was able to hold that the exemption clause was not specific
enough to exclude liability for expectancy damages.4 Kerr L.J.
1[198213 W.L.R. 1036 (C.A.), affg [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 476.
2 Ibid., at p. 1040, F.
2a See [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 476.
3 The exemption clause is reproduced below; see the text at footnote 16, infra.
4 If pressed, his Lordship would have found the exemption clause unreasonable: supra,
footnote 1 at p. 1053, C.
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found the disclaimer clause "unreasonable". under s. 55(3) and,
for good measure, found the wording of the disclaimer clause not
specific enough to exclude liability for loss of profits. Before
discussing the two grounds for decision, it is desirable to examine
the philosophical base of the decision.
Are All Contracts Consumer Contracts?
Lord Denning, as usual, gives the clearest guide to the court's
approach in dealing with the problem. His Lordship gives a brief
history of freedom of contract which has some charm but is
entirely irrelevant to the problem before the court. The story is
this:5
None of you nowadays will remember the trouble we had - when I was
called to the Bar - with exemption clauses. They were printed in small
print on the back of tickets and order forms and invoices. They were
contained in catalogues or timetables. They were held to be binding on any
person who took them without objection. No one ever did object. He never
read them or knew what was in them. No matter how unreasonable they
were, he was bound. All this was done in the name of "freedom of
contract." But the freedom was all on the side of the big concern which had
the use of the printing press. No freedom for the little man who took the
ticket or order form or invoice. The big concern said, "Take it or leave it."
The little man had no option but to take it. The big concern could and did
exempt itself from liability in its own interest without regard to the little
man. It got away with it time after time. When the courts said to the big
concern, "You must put it in clear words," the big concern had no
hesitation in doing so. It knew well that the little man would never read the
exemption clauses or understand them.
It was a bleak winter for our law of contract. It is illustrated by two cases,
Thompson v. London, Midland and Scottish Railway Co., [1930] 1 K.B. 41
(in which there was exemption from liability, not on the ticket, but only in
small print at the back of the timetable, and the company was held not
liable) and L'Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd. [1934] 2 K.B. 394 (in which there
was complete exemption in small print at the bottom of the order form, and
the company was held not liable).
His Lordship then describes how the courts slew the dragon of
freedom of contract.
This is a heart-warming tale about an old battle, although it is a
little ungenerous of his Lordship to give almost no credit to the
Legislature, which has done far more than the courts to remove
unfair contract terms. 6 The important thing about this battle is
5 Supra, footnote I at p. 1043, A-D.
6 The only statutes that his Lordship mentions are the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms)
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that it is entirely irrelevant to the problem of clauses excluding
liability for loss of profits, the issue in the present case. Many
observers have pointed out that these clauses are almost universal
in the commercial world. 7 Apart from their near-universality,
these clauses are essential to the functioning of modern
commerce.
8
Proof of the fact that the court is seeing a commercial contract
through consumer-coloured spectacles is to be seen in the way
that the court deals with the decision in R. W. Green Ltd. v. Cade
Bros. Farms.9 In that case, Griffiths J. refused to use s. 55(3) to
upset an almost identical disclaimer clause in a case involving the
sale of seed potatoes. That case was distinguished on the ground
that there the contract was negotiated between the National
Association of Seed Potato Merchants and the National Farmers'
Union.
In the present case, Lord Denning said: 10
The clause was not negotiated between persons of equal bargaining power.
It was inserted by the seed merchants in their invoices without any negoti-
ation with the farmers.
Thus, unless contractual terms are the product of negotiation
between trade associations, or else it is shown that there was
bargaining between the parties, a contractual provision in a
seller's contract is open to attack because of inequality of
bargaining power. It is difficult to see why a contractual term
hammered out between two trade associations should be treated
with respect, whereas no such respect is accorded to the contract
of two businessmen. In the present case, the defendant seed-mer-
chants are assumed to be in a superior bargaining position to the
plaintiff farmers but the only evidence for this is the disclaimer
clause. Since disclaimer clauses are virtually universal in the
commercial world, 1 a disclaimer clause is evidence of very little.
Act 1973 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977: see, supra, footnote 1 at p. 1044, H.
Mention might have been made of Hire Purchase Acts dating from 1938 and the
Consumer Credit Act 1974, all of which are more important than all the judicial
decisions on fundamental breach.
7 See, e.g., Macaulay, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study", 28
Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); Beale and Dugdale, "Contracts between Businessmen:
Planning and The Use of Contractual Remedies", 2 British J. Law Soc. 45 (1975).
8 See Morris A. Shanker, "A Retreat to Progress (A Proposal to Eliminate Damage
Awards for Loss of Business Profits)", 3 C.B.L.J. 363 (1979).
9 [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602, noted by Professor Ziegel in 57 Can. Bar Rev. 105 (1979).
10 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 1047, H.
11 See references cited in footnote 7, supra.
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Finally, what is one to make of the distinction between trade
association contracts and individual contracts when one learns
that, in the present case, the limitation clause is not one that is
individually negotiated? In Lord Denning M.R.'s words:1 2 "The
limitation clause here is of long standing in the seed trade. It has
been in use for many years." If this is the case, there is no
difference whatever between Green v. Cade3 and the present
case. If the National Farmers' Union, one of the strongest
pressure groups in British politics, 1 4 is unhappy with this
exclusion clause, then one might have thought that it might have
sought to seek a modification of the clause, or else have
persuaded the government to set up an insurance scheme. 15
The Exemption Clause
It is now appropriate to examine the exemption clause since
two judges found that the clause was not clear enough to exempt
the defendant. The clause read in part: 16
"All seeds, bulbs, corms, tubers, roots, shrubs, trees and plants ... offered
for sale or sold by us to which the Seeds Act 1920 or the Plant Varieties and
Seeds Act 1964 as the case may be and the Regulations thereunder apply
have been tested in accordance with the provisions of the same. In the event
of any seeds or plants sold or agreed to be sold by us not complying with the
express terms of the contract of sale or with any representation made by us
or by any duly authorised agent or representative on our behalf prior to, at
the time of, or in any such contract, or any seeds or plants proving defective
in varietal purity we will, at our option, replace the defective seeds or plants,
free of charge to the buyer or will refund all payments made to us by the
buyer in respect of the defective seeds or plants and this shall be the limit of
our obligation. We hereby exclude all liability for any loss or damage arising
from the use of any seeds or plants supplied by us and for any consequential
loss or damage arising out of such use or any failure in the performance of or
any defect in any seeds or plants supplied by us or for any other loss or
damage whatsoever save for, at our option, liability for any such replacement
or refund as aforesaid. In accordance with the established custom of the
12 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 1041, G.
13 Supra, footnote 9.
14 See, e.g., Peter Self and H. Storing, The State and the Farmer (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1963); Samuel H. Beer, Modern British Politics, 2nd ed. (London,
Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 111-13.
15 There are already situations for certain kinds of seed where buyers can purchase seed
certified by inspectors from the Ministry of Agriculture at a small extra charge. This was
the situation in Conemesco Ltd. v. Contrapol Ltd. (unreported), December 15, 1981,
Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No. 536 of 1981, noted by Kerr L.J. at,
supra, footnote 1 p. 1060, A-C.
16 Supra, footnote 1 at pp. 1041, G-42, C.
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seed trade any express or implied condition, statement or warranty,
statutory or otherwise, not stated in these conditions is hereby excluded.
The price of any seeds or plants sold or offered for sale by us is based upon
the foregoing limitations upon our liability. The price of such seeds or plants
would be much greater if a more extensive liability were required to be under-
taken by us."
To be sure, the clause is repetitive but, perhaps, the draftsman
had his eye on s. 55(5)(c) which directs the court in deciding
whether a clause is reasonable to have regard to "whether the
buyer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the ... extent
of the term". In any event, Lord Denning M.R. found the clause
"effective to limit the liability of the seed merchants to a return of
the money or replacement of the seeds".' 7 Moreover, "[t]he
explanation they give seems fair enough. They say that it is so as
to keep the price low: and if they were to undertake any greater
liability, the price would be much greater".18
Oliver L.J. took a different approach. He noted that at the
trial, counsel for the defendants conceded that they could not
have relied on the limitation clause had they delivered beetroot
seed or carrot seed. In his Lordship's view: 19
On this footing, the issue was simply one of fact - was this or was it not
cabbage seed? The judge's finding of fact, which was based on the evidence
of the defendants' own witnesses was that this seed was not cabbage seed in
any accepted sense of the term.
Later, the same judge made the same point thus: "A motor
bicycle delivered in purported fulfilment of a contract to sell a car
is not a defective car. 20 One might have thought that this kind of
sophistry had been put to rest by the decision of the House of
Lords in Ashington Piggeries.21 In that case, four members of the
House of Lords held that poisoned food for mink was still food.
The approach taken by Oliver L.J. in Finney Seeds would nullify
all limitation clauses in all sales cases.
Kerr L.J.'s approach is equally unsatisfactory. In the first
place, he lays great stress on the fact that the exemption clause
makes no express reference to negligence. In his Lordship's
words: 22
... a clause on the following lines would clearly have protected the defend-
ants:
17 Supra, footnote I at p. 1042, D.
18 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 1042, D.
19 Supra, footnote I at p. 1049, A.
20 Supra, footnote I at p. 1051, B.
21 Ashington Piggeries v. Christopher Hill Ltd., [1972] A.C. 441 (H.L.).
22 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 1057, B.
(Vol. 8
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"In the event of our supplying seed which, due to the negligence of our
suppliers or of our own employees, turns out to be seed of the wrong
kind and/or to be unmerchantable, we shall be under no liability other
than to refund the contract price."
The difficulty with this statement is, as his Lordship recognizes, 23
that it is at variance with the decision of the House of Lords in
Ailsa Craig Fishing Co. Ltd. v. Malvern Fishing Co. Ltd. and
Securicor (Scotland) Ltd.24 In that case, the House of Lords held
that, if the disclaimer clause was broad enough, no express
reference need be made to "negligence" for the clause to be
valid. Second, there is no evidence that the defendants were
negligent. In his Lordship's words, "due to some unexplained act
or omission on the part of the Dutch suppliers, the seed was in
fact unmerchantable even as autumn seed. '25 From this, it is not
clear that anyone was negligent!
Reasonableness
Although neither s. 55(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, nor
the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, directs the court to examine
the availability of insurance in deciding whether a contractual
provision is reasonable, 26 both Parker J. at first instance, and all
the members of the Court of Appeal considered the insurance
23 Supra, footnote I at p. 1058, A-B.
24 1982 S.L.T. 377 (H.L.).
25 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 1053, H.
26 Under s. 55(5) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, c. 54, Sch. 1, para. 11., the court shall
have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to the following
matters:
55(5)
(a) the strength of the bargaining positions of the seller and buyer relative to each
other, taking into account, among other things, the availability of suitable
alternative products and sources of supply;
(b) whether the buyer received an inducement to agree to the term or in
accepting it had an opportunity of buying the goods or suitable alternatives
without it from any source of supply;
(c) whether the buyer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence
and extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to any custom of
the trade and any previous course of dealing between the parties);
(d) where the term exempts from all or any of the provisions of section 13, 14 or
15 above if some condition is not complied with, whether it was reasonable at
the time of the contract to expect that compliance with that condition would
be practicable;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed, or adapted to the special
order of the buyer.
The identical guidelines are used in Schedule 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.
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factor. Parker J. had no doubts on this matter. He stated:27
I am entirely satisfied that it is possible for seedsmen to insure against this
risk. I am entirely satisfied that the cost of so doing would not materially
raise the price of seeds on the market. I am entirely satisfied that the
protection of this clause for the purposes of protecting against the very rare
case indeed, such as the present, is not reasonably required.
This view of the insurance situation was accepted by Lord
Denning M.R. 28 and by Oliver L.J. 29 The sad fact is that this
happy description of the insurance situation simply does not
square with the realities. The fact of the matter is that the
defendant had taken out insurance under the auspices of the
United Kingdom Agricultural Supply Trade Association Ltd.
(U.K.A.S.T.A.) which provided an annual cover of £20,000. The
policy required the defendants to have exercised due diligence
before they could recover. 30 Thus, in the present case, the
defendants were uninsured for at least £80,000 (£100,000 -
£20,000) or else they were uninsured for £100,000 if they had had
to pay out in respect of another claim. They would also be liable
for £100,000 if they failed to exercise "due diligence". 31 Kerr L.J.
was the only judge to point out the restricted cover the
defendants had. However, his Lordship stated: 32
... I am not persuaded that liability for rare events of this kind cannot be
adequately insured. Nor am I persuaded that the cost of such cover would
add significantly to the cost of the seed.
This is a strong statement of faith, but, lacking as it does, any
hard evidence to support it, it cannot be considered other than a
statement of faith. In the present case, a defendant who is for all
practical purposes uninsured, is regarded as being fully insured.
Lewis Carroll, who is quoted at the beginning of Lord Denning
M.R.'s judgment might have had some fun with this. 33
Conclusion
In recent years some learned commentators have urged us to
27 [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 476 at p. 480.
28 Supra, footnote I at p. 1048, B-D.
29 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 1052, F-G.
30 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 1058, H.
31 Sometimes, the courts have said that "due diligence" means that the insurer has to
prove more than negligence to defeat the insured's claim. It must prove "recklessness";
see, e.g., Woolfall & Rimmer v. Moyle, [1942] 1 K.B. 66 (C.A.), Fraser v. B. N.
Furman (Productions) Ltd., Miller Smith & Partners (A Firm) Third Party, [1967] 1
W.L.R. 898 (C.A.). But this interpretation may be peculiar to employers' liability
policies since if "due diligence" were held to mean the same as negligence, the insurer
could never be liable!
32 Supra, footnote I at p. 1058, H.
33 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 1040, E.
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abandon "fundamental breach" and to adopt a test of "reason-
ableness" or "unconscionability". 3 4 This change, it was argued,
would bring more satisfactory results since judges would be
forced to articulate the reasons which persuaded them to adopt
the view they did.35 The present case shows that that argument is
wrong. Two cases on "reasonableness" in four years have
produced as much confusion as scores of cases on fundamental
breach.
In my view, the best approach is not to entrust the judiciary
with vague phrases such as "reasonableness", "fundamental
breach" and the like, since these phrases generate an intolerable
amount of uncertainty. Instead, I would advocate three modest
reforms:
(1) Subrogation should be abolished in the field of property
damage. I have argued the case for this elsewhere 36 so I
will not elaborate on this.
(2) I would pass a statute which prevented the courts from
striking down provisions which excluded liability for
consequential loss in commercial contracts. It is true, that
sometimes these terms will be "imposed" by one party or
another but I do not think the courts can meaningfully
distinguish between "imposed" terms and "negotiable"
ones. The present case is a vivid demonstration of that
proposition. 37
(3) Finally, I would abolish the parol evidence rule in
commercial transactions. The decisions in Bauer v. Bank
of MontreaP8 and Carman Construction Ltd. v. Canadian
Pacific Railway Co. ,39 offend elementary principles of
fairness and justice. They should be reversed by statute.
3 See, e.g., R.C.B. Risk, Contracts, Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 1966
(Toronto, Richard de Boo, 1966) 207 at p. 253; S. M. Waddams, Comment, "Contracts
- Exemption Clauses - Fundamental Breach - Unconscionability", 17 U.W.O.L.
Rev. 295 (1979).
35 Ibid.
36 See Hasson, "Blindfolding The Courts: A Further Comment on Photo Production v.
Securicor", 5 C.B.L.J. 498 (1980-81).
37 Even in cases where one might reasonably guess that terms have been imposed on the
weaker party, it is doubtful if the courts can do much to help the weaker party: see e.g.,
R. G. McLean v. Canadian Vickers Ltd. (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 15, [1971] 1 O.R. 207
(C.A.).
38 (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 424, [198012 S.C.R. 102.
39 (1982), 136 D.L.R. (3d)y 193, 42 N.R. 147 (S.C.C.). The decision is criticised by
Professor Hayek in 7 C.B.L.J. 328 (1982-83).
8-8 C.B.L.J.
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These changes will not make businessmen embrace the law and
litigation, but it should reduce their hostility4 to rules which
violate well-established practices. That would be no mean feat.
Reuben A. Hasson*
EXCLUSIVE DEALING AFTER BOMBARDIER: THE LAW IS
NOT A GREAT DEAL CLEARER THAN BEFORE
The decision of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
("RTPC") in Director of Investigation and Research v.
Bombardier Ltd.1 is the first to interpret the s. 31.4(2) exclusive
dealing provision of the Combines Investigation Act.2 This
section prohibits exclusive dealing between a major supplier and
a customer which impedes the entry of a firm or product into the
market with the result that competition is or is likely to be
substantially lessened. While the decision contains no major
error, the RTPC's reasoning does suffer from several serious
omissions and, generally, the analysis throughout is far from
rigorous. Observers of Canadian competition law who had hoped
that taking the reviewable practices provisions in the Act out of
the hands of courts would result in extensive and sophisticated
analysis of economic issues will find little comfort in the
Bombardier decision.
The RTPC begins by addressing the important threshold
question of whether Bombardier, the manufacturer of Ski-Doo
and Moto-Ski snowmobiles, is "a major supplier". Largely by
recognizing that the indefinite article "a", rather than the definite
article "the", is used to modify "major supplier", the RTPC
40 Writing in 1959, Professor L.C.B. Gower wrote: "Hence, though contact between law
and business has not been lost it seems to be less direct, with a growing aloofness on the
part of the businessman and a growing remoteness from commercial realities on the part
of the lawyer". See his lecture on "Business" in Law and Opinion in the 20th Century,
Ginsberg, ed. (London, Stevens, 1959), pp. 143, 172.
Writing in 1982, Professor David Yates in his survey of commercial contracts in
various industries found that "Distrust of lawyers, and more especially judges' ability to
understand the businessman's problems was very marked." See his Exclusion Clauses in
Contracts (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1982), p. 25.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1(1980), 53 C.P.R. (2d) 47.
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as amended by S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 76.
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